\u3cem\u3eHawaiin Airlines, Inc. v. Norris\u3c/em\u3e: Railway Labor Act Preemption of State-Law Claims by Stieber, Kathryn A.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 61 | Issue 3 Article 7
1996
Hawaiin Airlines, Inc. v. Norris: Railway Labor Act
Preemption of State-Law Claims
Kathryn A. Stieber
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathryn A. Stieber, Hawaiin Airlines, Inc. v. Norris: Railway Labor Act Preemption of State-Law Claims, 61 J. Air L. & Com. 757 (1996)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol61/iss3/7
HAWAHAN AIRLINES, INC. V. NORRIS: RAILWAY LABOR
ACT PREEMPTION OF STATE-LAW CLAIMS
LABOR LAW-Railway Labor Act1 preemption of state-law
claims. The threshold question in Railway Labor Act preemp-
tion is whether the state law claim is independent of a collective
bargaining agreement such that adjudication may proceed on a
purely factual determination and does not require interpreta-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
v. Norri
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I. INTRODUCTION
ON JULY 15, 1987, Grant Norris, a mechanic employed by
Hawaiian Airlines, discovered that one of the tires on a DC-
9 preparing for take-off was worn. Upon further inspection,
Norris discovered damage to the axle sleeve indicating potential
landing gear failure. Grooves and ridges had worn into the
sleeve, which should have been smooth under normal circum-
stances. Norris reported the damage to his supervisor and rec-
ommended replacement of the entire sleeve. Instead of
replacement, the supervisor ordered that the sleeve be sanded
down,, and the plane took off with the repaired axle sleeve.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safety regulations re-
quire that mechanics sign off on all repairs and certify that the
repaired airplane is suitable for flight. 3 At the end of his shift,
Norris refused to sign the maintenance repair record for the
axle sleeve and the supervisor suspended him. Norris immedi-
ately reported the incident to the FAA.4
In response to his suspension, Norris filed a grievance in ac-
cordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
that governed his employment relationship with Hawaiian Air-
lines.5. At the grievance hearing, the airline accused Norris of
insubordination, based on his refusal to sign the maintenance
record, and stated this as the reason for his termination.6 Norris
appealed the hearing officer's decision on the grounds that the
collective bargaining agreement between Hawaiian Airlines and
the IAMAW prohibited termination without just cause and pro-
tected his refusal to violate safety regulations.' Prior to a second
hearing, Hawaiian Airlines offered to reinstate Norris with a sus-
3 Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding and Alteration Records,
14 C.F.R. § 43.9(a) (1995). The maintenance record requires:
If the work performed on the aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine,.
propeller, appliance, or component part has been performed satis-
factorily, [the record must include] the signature, certificate
number, and kind of certificate held by the person approving the
work. The signature constitutes the approval for return to service
only for the work performed.
14 C.F.R. § 43.9(a) (4).
4 Following an investigation, the FAA assessed Hawaiian Airlines was assessed a
civil penalty of $964,000. Nor-is, 114 S. Ct. at 2242 n.1.
5 Norris was a member of the International Association of Machinists and




pension without pay and a probationary period.' Norris re-
jected the offer and filed suit against Hawaiian Airlines in state
court, alleging breach of contract and wrongful discharge in vio-
lation of FAA safety regulations and the Hawaii Whistleblowers'
Protection Act.9 Hawaiian Airlines removed the suit to the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.10 The dis-
trict court, holding that the Railway Labor Act preempted the
contract claim, dismissed the breach of contract action and re-
manded the wrongful discharge claims to state court."1 The
state court dismissed the remaining claim, holding that the Rail-
way Labor Act's arbitration mechanisms were Norris's sole
source of relief.12
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed and held
that the Railway Labor Act did not preempt Norris's tort claims
for wrongful discharge under state law.13 The Hawaii Supreme
Court, citing the United States Supreme Court opinion in Con-
solidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 4 held that
the Railway Labor Act preempts only "contractually defined" dis-
putes that are the subject of a collective bargaining agreement. 15
In so holding, the Hawaii Supreme Court also relied upon Lingle
v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.1 6 In Lingle the Supreme
Court held that the Labor Management Relations Act could not
preempt a state law wrongful discharge claim if the action did
not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and could be resolved by "purely factual questions." 17
The first part of this note examines the Railway Labor Act and
the Labor Management Relations Act. Both Acts govern labor
disputes and provide the framework for federal preemption.
8 Id.
9 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2242-43; see also Hawaii Whistleblowers' Protection Act,
HAw. REv. STAT. §§. 378-61 to 378-69 (1995).
10 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2243.
I Id.
12 Id. Additionally, Norris filed a second suit in Hawaii state court against Ha-
waiian Airlines officers for retaliatory discharge in violation of the Hawaii
Whistleblower Protection Act. Id. These claims were also dismissed on the basis
of preemption by the Railway Act. Id.
Is Id.; see also Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 847 P.2d 263 (Haw. 1993); Nor-
ris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634 (Haw. 1992). These cases were consol-
idated for appeal to the United States Supreme Court in Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2243.
14 491 U.S. 299 (1989).
15 Noris, 114 S. Ct. at 2243.
16 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
17 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2243; see also Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1994) and discussion infra Parts I1.B and III.B.
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The second part traces the development of two lines of Supreme
Court opinions, those finding preemption and those carving out
exceptions to this preemption. The final part of this note ana-
lyzes the Norris decision, its treatment of prior Supreme Court
holdings, and the adequacy of its response to the preemption
conflict.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT18
Congress passed the Railway Labor Act in 1934 as a dispute
resolution mechanism for actions "growing out of grievances or
out of the interpretation and application of agreements con-
cerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."'19
The main purpose of the Railway Labor Act is to promote ef-
fective and orderly settlement of labor disputes and to create
uniformity in labor practices. 20 Congress recognized that collec-
tive bargaining agreements encompass the divergent interests of
the railroad unions and carriers and that particularized disputes
would be more efficiently solved in an industry forum emphasiz-
ing arbitration rather than litigation.2' This recognition led to
18 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988). Congress extended the Railway Act in 1936 to
include the airline industry. Id. §§ 181-188. "All of the provisions . . .are
extended to and shall cover every common carrier by air engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce .... " Id. § 181. See also International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682 (1963).
19 45 U.S.C. § 151(a). Specifically, 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) provides:
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid any interruption to
commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2)
to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among em-
ployees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise,
of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to pro-
vide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees
in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this
chapter; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5)
to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or applica-
tion of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions.
20 Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987); Com-
ment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo in Railway Labor Disputes, 60,
COLUM. L. REv. 381, 383 (1960) [hereinafter Railway Labor Disputes]. See generally
H.R. REP. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. No. 1065, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934).
21 Lloyd K. Garrison, National Railroad Adjustment Board, A Unique Administrative
Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567, 568-75 (1937).
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* the establishment of a specialized "quasi-judicial tribunal" to de-
velop and promulgate a uniform theory of labor agreement
interpretation.22
To meet its goals of creating a uniform body of law and pro-
moting the efficient settlement of disputes, the Railway Labor
Act established a detailed administrative system to address em-
ployee grievances.2 When a dispute arises between employees
and management, the parties must first attempt to settle the
matter themselves and may not proceed until they have ex-
hausted all internal procedures.2 4 If the internal process fails,
then the parties must appear before a National Mediation
Board, a panel established by the Railway Labor Act to hear such
disputes. 5 Finally, there is a compulsory arbitration mechanism
for certain kinds of disputes.2 6 The National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board has exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes and
the outcome of arbitration is binding.2 7 The rationale for bind-
ing arbitration in minor disputes is that:
There are too many people, too many problems, too many un-
foreseeable contingencies to make the words of the contract the
exclusive source of rights and duties .... Within the sphere of
collective bargaining, the institutional characteristics and the
governmental nature of the collective-bargaining process de-
mand a common law of the shop which implements and fur-
nishes the context of the agreement.28
But, arbitration is not mandatory for disputes classified as major,
and the parties are not precluded from seeking a judicial rem-
22 Id. at 593. A specialized industry forum was viewed as an advantage to em-
ployees afforded few common law and statutory protections. See Richard School-
man, Developments in the Preemption of Otherwise Justiciable Employment-Related Claims
by the Railway Labor Act, ALA-ABA COURSE OF STUDY (Apr. 1, 1993). Employees,
through union representatives, now had a forum in which to air grievances.
"Such men from now on can hold their heads erect and feel that they can negoti-
ate through representatives freely chosen by themselves in regard to any dispute
they may have with the owners of the railroads." Hearings Before Comm. on Inter-
state Commerce on S.3266, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 78 CONG. REc.
12,553, 12,554 (1934).
23 45 U.S.C. §§ 152-162.
24 Id. § 152.
25 Id. § 154.
26 Id. § 153.
27 Id.
28 Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HA1v. L. REv. 1482,
1498-99 (1959).
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edy.2 9 It is the appropriateness of the major/minor distinction
and its effect on the dispute resolution process that is at the root
of the current preemption controversy.3 °
B. THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT31
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act autho-
rizes federal preemption of labor contract disputes and
provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.3 2
Like the Railway Labor Act, the 'Labor Management Relations
Act governs airlines as an "industry affecting commerce."3 3
Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act to
promote collective bargaining agreements and to encourage la-
bor and management to honor the terms of the agreements. 34
Although preemption was clear for breach of contract claims,
the emergence of competing state employment rights chal-
lenged the scope of federal preemption.33 Originally, courts in-
terpreted the Labor Management Relations Act to create
concurrent federal and state jurisdiction in employment related
contract disputes.36 But, in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,3 7 the
29 45 U.S.C. § 152; Railway Labor Dispute, supra note 20, at 385. For further
discussion of the major/minor dispute distinction, see discussion infra Part III.
so See discussion infra Part III. According to Justice Frankfurter, the unique
aspects of the relationship between labor, management and collective bargaining
agreements admonish against mutilating the comprehensive and complicated sys-
tem governing railroad industrial relations by episodic utilization of inapposite
judicial remedies. Elgin v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 749-61 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
31 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1993).
32 Id. § 185(a).
33 Id. § 185(b); see H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1172 (1947).
34 Mark Adams, Struggling Through the Thicket: Section 301 and the Washington
Supreme Court, 15 BERKELEYJ. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 106, 117 (1994).
35 Rebecca H. White, Section 301's Preemption of State Law Claims: A Model for
Analysis, 41 ALA. L. REv. 377, 383-91 (1990). Generally, state law will not be pre-
empted unless the law directly conflicts with federal law or policy. See U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2; Adams, supra note 34, at 108-09.
s6 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1985).
37 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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Supreme Court held that Congress intended the preemption
clause of the Labor Management Relations Act to create a uni-
form body of substantive federal labor law.3 8 Because Congress
did not specify the scope of preemption, courts have focused on
federal labor policies encouraging uniformity and maintaining
"the integrity of the grievance and arbitration process." 39 These
policies require that the scope of preemption extend beyond
pure adjudication of contract disputes to any dispute arising out
of a labor relationship governed by a collective bargaining
agreement.40
Thus, questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement
agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from
breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to
uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context
of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in
tort.41
The Labor Management Relations Act requires federal pre-
emption so long as the claim invokes an employment right
either created or governed by the collective bargaining agree-
ment.42  Courts have struggled, however, in determining
whether an employment right is created by state law or by a col-
lective bargaining agreement.4" As with preemption under the
Railway Labor Act, the question turns on an analysis of the dis-
puted right and whether the collective bargaining agreement is
implicated.44
38 Id. at 103-04; see also Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19 White, supra note 35, at 381. For a discussion of the inadequacy of federal
labor policy as ajustification for the development of section 301 preemption doc-
trine, see Michael Harper, Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers for the Tril-
ogy, Only One for Lingle and Lueck, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 685 (1990).
40 Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211.
41 Id.
42 Adams, supra note 34, at 125.
43 See, e.g., Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994); Steelworkers v. Rawson,
495 U.S. 362 (1990); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef., Inc., 486 U.S. 399
(1988); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987); Lueck, 471 U.S. at 202.
Some commentators have characterized the confusion surrounding LMRA pre-
emption as a "thicket." Adams, supra note 34, at 107.
- See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 399; Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522 (10th
Cir. 1992); Tellez v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 908 (1987); see also discussion infra Parts III.B and IV. But see Grote v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958
(1990) (holding that the scope of preemption under the Railway Labor Act is
broader than Labor Management Relations Act preemption).
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III. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE
RAILWAY LABOR ACT
A. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FAVORING PREEMPTION -BuRLY
AzVREws, AND CoNAWzL
1. The Major/Minor Dispute Distinction and the "Omitted" Case
Doctrine
In Elgin, J. & E. Railway v. Burley,45 the Supreme Court ex-
amined whether an adjustment board decision under the Rail-
way Labor Act was valid and legally effective.46 Standard Oil
employed the original plaintiffs as yardmen in its Whiting, Indi-
ana facility. On July 24, 1934, the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Rail-
way Company took over the Whiting yard and the plaintiffs
became Elgin employees and members of the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen (the Brotherhood). Subsequently, the
Brotherhood entered into contract negotiations with Elgin on
behalf of the yardmen. The negotiations were productive except
in determining shift starting time.47 The controversy was
whether the previous collective bargaining agreement between
the Brotherhood and Elgin was applicable to the newly admitted
yardmen, or, alternatively, if the terms of that agreement were
suspended pending a new agreement.48 Work continued during
the ongoing negotiations.
Ultimately, the Brotherhood filed a complaint on behalf of
the yardmer, for violations of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and commenced procedures before the National Railroad
Adjustment Board (Board). 49 On October 31, 1938, the Broth-
erhood accepted an offer by Elgin to settle the claim, advised
the Board of their agreement, and withdrew the complaint.5 °
Within the year, a new dispute arose over the same issue and the
Brotherhood filed a new claim with the National Railroad Ad-
justment Board.51 The Board ruled that the dispute had already
been settled and denied further relief.52
45 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
46 Id. at 712.
47 Id. at 713. While employed by Standard Oil, the yardmen's starting times
varied according to operational need. Id. Elgin, however, determined start times
in accordance with its collective bargaining agreement with the Brotherhood. Id.
48 Id. at 713.
49 Id. at 714.
50 Burley, 325 U.S. at 715-16.
51 Id. at 715.
52 Id. at 718.
764
CASENOTE
After being denied by the Board, the yardmen filed suit in
United States district court, alleging that the Board was author-
ized to act "merely as an arbiter" and was, therefore, acting be-
yond the scope of its authority in issuing a final judgment on a
legal question.53 In addition to their claim that the Board's de-
cision was void, the yardmen challenged the authority of the
Brotherhood to act on their behalf in settling any disputes with
Elgin. Further, the yardmen argued that the Railway Labor Act
denied them due process by prohibiting judicial review of Board
decisions. 54 The district court granted summary judgment for
Elgin and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.55 The
Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court and remanded to the
district court.56
The Supreme Court focused on the yardmen's position that
the judgment of the Board was advisory and, therefore, the par-
ties were free to accept or reject any decision or award rendered
by the Board.5 Relying on Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad,8 the
yardmen claimed that the Board's decision was not legally bind-
ing and it did not preclude them from seeking recourse in the
district court.59 The Burley Court distinguished the Moore deci-
sion, rejecting it as controlling authority because Moore ad-
dressed neither the issue of the validity of an award nor the
Board's authority to bind the parties.60  Additionally, unlike
Moore, subsequent interpretations of the Railway Labor Act re-
lied upon the distinction between minor grievances and major
disputes.61
53 Id. at 718-19.
54 Id. at 719.
55 Burley, 325 U.S. at 720.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 312 U.S. 630 (1941). The Moore Court held that the Railway Labor Act's
dispute resolution mechanisms were voluntary and that an employee "was not
required by the Railway Labor Act to seek adjustment of this controversy with the
railroad as a prerequisite to suit for wrongful discharge." Id. at 636.
59 Burley, 325 U.S. at 720-21.
60 Id. at 721. The petitioner in Moore was a member of the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen and brought a wrongful discharge suit in Mississippi state
court. Moore, 312 U.S. at 632. The railroad argued that the Railway Labor Act
required that "disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or
application of agreements" be referred to an adjustment board, but the Court
declined to deny a wrongful discharge claim based upon that language. Moore,
312 U.S. at 635.
61 Burley, 325 U.S. at 721.
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Identifying two classes of labor disputes, the Burley Court iden-
tified separate procedural mechanisms for each.62 In its general
purposes provision, the Railway Labor Act lists five distinct goals:
subsection (4) provides for the settlement of "disputes concern-
ing rates of pay, rules, or working conditions," whereas subsec-
tion (5) seeks settlement of "disputes growing out of grievances,
or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions."63 Major disputes are those described by
subsection (4) and revolve around the formation of collective
bargaining agreements and the assertion of employment
rights.64 Major disputes "look to the acquisition of rights for the
future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the
past."65 These disputes involve rights that exist beyond any ex-
isting or contemplated collective bargaining agreement.66 Mi-
nor grievances are described in subsection (5) and occur after
the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. They are
disagreements about interpretation or application of the terms
and conditions of the existing agreement "to a specific situation
or to an omitted case."' 67 An "omitted case" is a claim arising out
of the employment relationship but not addressed by the ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement.6
62 Id. at 722-23.
63 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1989); Burley, 325 U.S. at 722.
64 Burley, 325 U.S. at 723.
65 Id.
66 Id. See, e.g., Association of Flight Attendants v. USAir Inc., 24 F.3d 1432
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (dispute determining applicability of collective bargaining
agreement); CSX Transp. Inc. v. Marquar, 980 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1992); United
Transp. Union v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 979 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1646 (1993) (dispute challenging validity of collective bargaining
agreement); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Boston and Main Corp., 808 F.2d
150 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830 (1987) (dispute challenging carrier's
practice of abolishing positions subject to collective bargaining agreement).
67 Burley, 335 U.S. at 723. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Conemaugh &
Black Lick Ry., 894 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1990); Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v.
Brotherhood.of R.R. Signalmen, 882 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044
(1989) (dispute challenging union's right to engage, in sympathy strike); Brother-
hood of Maintenance of Way.Employees v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 840
F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (dispute challenging crew size, scheduling, and
meal periods); Verdon v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 828 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry.,
835 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Kan. 1993) (dispute challenging railroad's voluntary resig-
nation program).
68 Burley, 325 U.S. at 723. But cf. Davies v. American Airlines, 971 F.2d 463
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993) (interpreting Conrail to over-
rule the "omitted case" distinction) and infra notes 200-11 and accompanying
text.
Under the Railway Labor Act, attempted settlement through
internal negotiation is required for both major and minor dis-
putes.69 Any potential agreement at this stage is voluntary, but
both parties have an affirmative duty to enter into negotia-
tions. 70 After initial negotiations, major disputes continue to be
subject to voluntary dispute resolution mechanisms ranging
from mediation to arbitration. 71 The settlement of minor dis-
putes, on the other hand, is not voluntary.72 "The adjustment
board is established with 'jurisdiction' to determine grievances
and make awards concerning them. Each party to the dispute
may submit it for decision, whether or not the other is willing,
provided he has himself discharged the initial duty of
negotiation."73
After drawing this distinction between major disputes with a
non-compulsory dispute resolution process and minor disputes
with a compulsory and binding arbitration, the Burley Court
went on to examine the authority of the Brotherhood to repre-
sent the yardmen and to submit their disputes to the adjustment
board.74 Holding that the union did not have such authority,
the Court defined the boundary between collective bargaining
issues (major disputes) and the settling of grievances pursuant
to an existing collective bargaining agreement (minor dis-
putes) .7 Although a union may be authorized to represent an
employee in securing future rights, in some instances it may not
be authorized to negotiate a dispute involving a violation of the
employee's rights prior to the creation of a collective bargaining
agreement. 76 The basis of the Burley Court's reasoning seems to
be that because employees are represented by the union in the
making of collective bargaining agreements, the individual em-
ployee may not be compelled to arbitrate a major dispute. An
employee embroiled in a minor dispute, however, may refuse to
authorize continued representation before a mandatory and
binding adjustment board hearing.77 The Court, therefore, re-
69 Burley, 325 U.S. at 724-25; 45 U.S.C. § 152.
70 Burley, 325 U.S. at 724-25.
71 Id. at 725.
72 Id. at 727.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 728-37.
75 Burley, 335 U.S. at 73940.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 740-41.
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manded the case for a factual determination as to whether the
yardmen had authorized the Brotherhood to represent them. 78
Justice Frankfurter's dissent foreshadows the controversy the
major/minor distinction would cause in Railway Labor Act pre-
emption questions. Frankfurter criticized the majority's willing-
ness to "sever what is organic" and recognize two classes of
disputes with "illadapted judicial interferences." 79 Frankfurter
argued that the purpose Qf the Railway Labor Act was to impose
a uniform system of dispute resolution on a unique employment
relationship and that the Act's dispute resolution mechanisms
should be self-contained, without any form of judicial over-
sight:8" "The considerations making for harmonious adjustment
of railroad industrial relations through the machinery designed
by Congress in the Railway Labor Act are disregarded by al-
lowing that machinery to be by-passed and by introducing dislo-
cating differentiations through individual resort to the courts in
the application of a collective agreement."81 Justice Frankfurter
concluded that the Railway Labor Act precludes all judicial re-
view of all aspects of the dispute resolution process.82
2. Strict Application of the Major/Minor Distinction
In Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,83 the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Company employed Andrews, whose employ-
ment was subject to a collective bargaining agreement. Andrews
did not work during his recovery from a car accident. When
Louisville & Nashville refused to allow him to return to work
following his recovery, Andrews sued Louisville & Nashville for
wrongful discharge in Georgia state court.84 Louisville & Nash-
ville, removed the action to United States district court and the
case was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
under the Railway Labor Act.8 5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
78 Id. at 749.
79 Id. at 752-57 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
80 Burley, 325 U.S. at 752-57 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also discussion
supra Part II.A.
81 Burley, 325 U.S. at 760 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It is important to note,
however, that the major/minor distinction outlined by the majority permitted
resort to the courts not "in the application of a collective agreement," but only
for major disputes independent of or in the formation of a collective bargaining
agreement. Burley, 325 U.S. at 723. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
82 Burley, 325 U.S. at 761 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
84 Id. at 320-21.
85 Id. at 321.
peals affirmed the dismissal.86 The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the Railway Labor Act preempted Andrews'
claim.87
In Andrews, the Supreme Court was once again confronted
with the holding of Moore"8 and the inevitable argument that the
dispute resolution mechanisms of the Railway Labor Act are
"optional," and parties are therefore free to turn to the courts
for adjudication.8 9 After reviewing the Court's subsequent treat-
ment of Railway Labor Act preemption issues, the Andrews Court
concluded: "IT]he notion that the grievance and arbitration
procedures provided for minor disputes in the Railway Labor
Act are optional, to be availed of as the employee or the carrier
chooses, was never good history and is no longer good law."9"
The Court next addressed the question of whether a claim for
wrongful discharge should be classified as a major or minor
dispute.
The Court examined Andrews' proposition that an employ-
ment contract is a creation of state law and that a dispute con-
cerning its breach is beyond the 'each of the Railway Labor
Act.91' In rejecting this argument, the Court found that An-
drews, by framing his claim as a breach of contract action, was
merely attempting to circumvent the mandatory dispute resolu-
tion procedures of the Railway Labor Act.92 First, the Court
noted that the expansion of state law jurisdiction in Moore was
later rejected by the Court in the context of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act.93 Next, the Court refused to make a distinc-
tion between a wrongful discharge claim and a minor grievance
arising out of a dispute over termination, the latter subject
clearly covered by the collective bargaining agreement.94 The
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
89 Andrews, 406 U.S. at 321-22.
90 Id. at 322. See Walker v. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196 (1966); Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
91 Andrews, 406 U.S. at 323; see also Moore, 312 U.S. at 633-34 (reversing the 5th
Circuit's rejection of state law analysis in favor of "the interpretation and applica-
tion of a collective contract of an interstate railroad with its employees."); Trans-
continental & Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
92 Andrews, 406 U.S. at 323-24.
93 Id. at 323 (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)). In
Maddox, the Court declined to preserve state breach of contract claims under the
Labor Management Relations Act and stated in dicta that the Moore rule may be
incorrect under the Railway Labor Act as well. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 655-56.
94 Andrews, 406 U.S. at 324.
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mandatory dispute resolution procedures of the Railway Labor
Act controlled, according to the Court, because the basis for
resolving Andrews' wrongful discharge claim could be found in
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.9 5 Resolution
of that claim, therefore, required interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. Interpretation of the dispute revealed a
minor dispute warranting compulsory arbitration under the
Railway Labor Act.96 For these reasons, the Court overruled
Moore and held that disputing parties are obligated under the
Railway Labor Act to settle minor disputes before the adjust-
ment board.97
Justice Douglas dissented from the majority's opinion be-
cause of the nature of the relief Andrews sought and because
Louisville & Nashville no longer employed Andrews. 98 First, An-
drews did not seek reinstatement and back pay, the only kinds of
relief provided for in a collective bargaining agreement.9 9 Be-
cause Andrews sought financial compensation for his wrongful
discharge, not reemployment, the collective bargaining agree-
ment, according to Justice Douglas, did not apply. 100 Second,
Justice Douglas argued that because Louisville & Nashville no
longer employed Andrews, the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement did not apply to him, the Railway Labor Act did
not apply, and, thus, the adjustment board had no authority to
issue a decision. 0 1 This argument would insulate Andrews'
claim from characterization as a major or minor dispute and
would require that Andrews look solely to state contract law for
relief.
Justice Douglas argued that the Railway Labor Act should not
preempt a state wrongful discharge claim because "[e]veryone
who joins a union does not give up his civil rights. '1 02 He out-
lined three reasons why the adjustment board was not compe-
tent to hear Andrews' claim: (1) board members were unlikely
to know the local law governing employment contracts; (2)
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 325-26.
98 Id. at 326-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99 Andrews, 406 U.S. at 327 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 326-28. Justice Douglas distinguished the criticized Moore opinion
from the instant controversy because the employees in Moore were current em-
ployees seeking relief by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
328.
102 Id. at 330.
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board members were not usually legal professionals; and (3) a
discharged employee seeking damages may be entitled to have
the claim heard by a jury.10 3 Justice Douglas therefore con-
cluded that when an employee leaves the employment relation-
ship, the dispute moves beyond the reach of the Railway Labor
Act mechanisms. 04 Instead, Justice Douglas advocated leaving
the choice to the disgruntled employee: either maintain employ-
ment and be satisfied with the rights enumerated in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, or quit employment (forsaking all
accompanying rights and privileges) and seek recourse under
the laws of the state. 10 5 He saw no other adequate method of
protecting discharged employees and was concerned that their
former unions would not provide a fair hearing: "Given the na-
ture of permanent dischargees' weak positions vis-a-vis their for-
mer unions, the personnel manning the adjustment
mechanism, its haphazard decisional process, and the absence
of judicial review of Board decisions, the risk is substantial that
valid complaints of permanent dischargees such as Andrews will
be unfairly treated.' 0 6
3. Refining the Major/Minor Distinction
In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 07
long-standing company policy required employees to submit to
periodic physical examinations which, under certain circum-
stances, included drug testing.10 Conrail, the employer, subse-
quently changed this policy and unilaterally declared that drug
testing would be routinely included in all standard physical ex-
aminations.109 Conrail employees filed suit in United States dis-
trict court through their union, the Railway Labor Executives'
Association."0 Although both parties agreed the Railway Labor
Act governed the instant labor dispute, they disagreed as to
whether the dispute, which arose out of Conrail's new policy,
should be classified as a major or minor dispute."' The district
103 Id. at 329.
104 Andrews, 406 U.S. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 330-31.
106 Id. at 333-34.
107 491 U.S. 299 (1989) [hereinafter Conrail].
108 Id. at 300.
109 Id.
110 Id.
III Id. at 301. This case illustrates the difficulty of separating the major/minor
dispute question and its implications for voluntary or mandatory procedural re-
quirements from the larger issue of whether or not preemption is appropriate.
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court classified the dispute as minor because the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement included Conrail's general pol-
icy of physical examinations, thus it was within Conrail's discre-
tion to conduct drug testing under the agreement. 112 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that
the dispute was major because the terms of the existing collec-
tive bargaining agreement related to physical examinations and
could not be extended to justify an entirely new policy of com-
prehensive drug testing. 113 The Supreme Court reversed the
Third Circuit, holding that challenges to condict that is "argua-
bly justified" by an existing collective bargaining agreement are
preempted by the Railway Labor Act." 4
The Court began by discussing the major/minor dispute dis-
tinction outlined in Burley." 5 The focus, according to the
Court, should be on whether the controversy arises out of the
enforcement or the creation of contract rights. 1 1 6 Denying that
the distinction between major and minor disputes could be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis, the Court stated:
[T]he line drawn in Burley looks to whether a claim has been
made that the terms of an existing agreement either establish or
refute the presence of a right to take the disputed action. The
distinguishing feature of such a case is that the dispute may be
conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing agreement.!"
According to this definition, classification of a dispute as a ma-
jor or minor depends on how the complaining party pleads the
cause of action." 8 The Court contemplated the potential for
abuse if one party pleads so as to characterize the dispute as
minor, thereby presupposing an interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement, which may effectively create terms and
conditions not necessarily contemplated by the agreement." 9
When this happens, a court is justified in substituting its own
characterization of the dispute to ensure an impartial major/
The threshold question of whether a dispute is preempted should not turn on a
classification that is subject to manipulation by the disputing parties. Railway La-
bor Disputes, supra note 20, at 395-96. See also discussion infra Part V.
112 Conrai 491 U.S. at 301.
113 Conrail 845 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1988).
114 Conrail, 491 U.S. at 301.
115 Id. at 302-03. See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
116 Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302.
117 Id. at 305.
118 Id.
119 Conrail, 491 U.S. at 306.
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minor classification. 120 The'Conrail Court set forth a standard
for evaluating disputes when confronted by artful pleading:
"'[I]f the disputed action of one of the parties can "arguably" be
justified by the existing agreement or... if the contention that
the labor contract sanctions the disputed action is not "obvi-
ously insubstantial," the controversy is a [minor dispute] within
the exclusive province of the National Railroad Adjustment
Board. "121
The lenient "arguably justified" standard requires only that
the employer set forth a nonfrivolous justification for its actions
under the existing collective bargaining agreement.1 22 Under
this test, the Court reasoned that employers would be bound to
act within the agreement, while still retaining flexibility in em-
ployee relations and workplace management. 23 Any test requir-
ing a stronger showing of contractual rights would effectively
prohibit employers from responding to changing circumstances
during the course of the agreement. 24 Additionally, a stricter
standard would constrain "the freedom of unions and employ-
ers to contract for discretion." 25 Since collective bargaining
agreements set parameters for unilateral management activity,
any heightened review of the terms of the agieement by the
courts would effectively "freeze" the status quo whenever there
was a dispute over working conditions. 126  Above all else, the
Court feared that unnecessary judicial evaluation of the substan-
tive provisions of collective bargaining agreements would jeop-
ardize the parties' freedom to contract. 27
Although the Court acknowledged the "arguably justified"
standard could delay the settlement of bona fide major disputes
pending the result of arbitration, the Court indicated that the
standard's adherence to the core principles of the Railway La-
bor Act justified such a risk.' 28 Specifically, the Court cited the
policies favoring the creation of collective bargaining agree-
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting Local 1477 United Transp. Union v. Baker, 482 F.2d 228, 230
(6th Cir. 1973)).
122 Conrai4 491 U.S. at 307. The employer's claim that the disputed activity is
permitted under the agreement may not be "obviously insubstantial or frivolous,
nor made in bad faith." Id. at 310.
123 Id. at 310.
124 Id. at 309.
125 Id. at 308.
126 Id. at 308-09.
127 Conrai4 491 U.S. at 308-09.
128 Id. at 310.
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ments, the uniform settlement of disputes, uninterrupted com-
merce activities, and stable labor relations.129 The Court
justified precluding carriers and unions from looking beyond
the dispute resolution mechanisms of the collective bargaining
agreement and the Railway Labor Act because waiting "until the
[Adjustment] Board determines on the merits that the em-
ployer's interpretation of the agreement is incorrect will assure
that the risks of self-help are not needlessly undertaken and will
aid '[t]he peaceable settlement of labor controversies."'"" 0
B. SUPREME COURT MOVEMENT AWAY FROM PREEMPTION-
BuELzz AND LNGLE
1. Availability of Alternative Causes of Action
In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway v. Buell,'3 1 the Court
examined whether the Railway Labor Act provided the exclusive
remedy for an injured employee, precluding all other causes of
action.1 32  Jim Buell, employed as a carman by the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (Atchison, Topeka),
claimed his supervisor and co-workers physically and psychologi-
cally abused him. Buell further alleged this abuse led to an
emotional breakdown, and that Atchison, Topeka knew of and
condoned the harassment. Although a collective bargaining
agreement, which included grievance procedures, governed the
carmen and Atchison, Topeka, Buell did not utilize those proce-
dures. Instead, he filed a complaint in United States district
court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). a 3
Atchison, Topeka obtained summary judgment on the grounds
that the district court did not have jurisdiction over a labor dis-
pute involving an entity subject to the Railway Labor Act.13 4 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that a FELA
remedy was available to Buell because his "negligent failure to
129 Id.
130 Id. at 311 (quoting Virginian Ry. v. Railway Employees, 300 U.S. 515, 552
(1937)). Contra Railway Labor Disputes, supra note 20.
s13 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
132 Id. at 559.
133 Id. FELA provides:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce be-
tween any of the several States ... shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce ... resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of
any of the officers, or employees of such carrier ....
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
134 Buell, 480 U.S. at 560.
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maintain a safe workplace" cause of action was not an arbitrable
claim under the Railway Labor Act. 13  The Supreme Court af-
firmed and held that the Railway Labor Act did not preempt
Buell's FELA claim.
First, the Court examined the nature and purpose of the
FELA statute in relation to the role of the Railway Labor Act. 136
In furtherance of Congress' primary goal of removing employer
tort liability defenses for injuries occurring in the workplace,
FELA prohibits any attempt by an interstate carrier to limit its
FELA liability.1 3 7 The general focus of the Railway Labor Act,
on the other hand, is the resolution of labor disputes through
specific procedural mechanisms. 13  Specific questions of tort
liability are not addressed.13 ° Atchison, Topeka argued that Bu-
ell's claims constituted a minor dispute and were, therefore, ex-
clusively subject to the mandatory procedures enumerated in
the Railway Labor Act.140
Rejecting Atchison, Topeka's argument, the Court held that
the fact that a claim under FELA may be arbitrated in another
forum did not, by itself, void the FELA claim.' Although the
challenged conduct in the FELA action may have been "cured
or avoided by the timely invocation of the grievance machinery,"
that possibility alone would not bar a personal injury action
under FELA. 142 The policy reasons favoring mandatory arbitra-
tion procedures cannot supersede a claim based upon a substan-
tive statute designed to guarantee minimum protections to
workers. 43 The Court reasoned that "[i]t is inconceivable that
Congress intended that a worker who suffered a disabling injury
would be denied recovery under the FELA simply because he
might also be able to process a narrow labor grievance under
the RLA to a successful conclusion."144
According to the Court, the Railway Labor Act is the exclusive
remedy when the injured employee's complaint arises solely
under the Railway Labor Act and can only be construed as a
135 Id.
136 Id. at 561-63.
137 Id. at 562.
13 Id.
139 Buell 480 U.S. at 562.
140 Id. at 563. See discussion supra Part IIA.
141 Bue/l 480 U.S. at 563.
142 Id. at 564-65.
143 Id. at 565-66.
144 Id. at 565.
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labor grievance.1 45 The Court's emphasis that Railway Labor Act
remedies are exclusive only when the dispute is "based squarely
on an alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement"
foreshadows the erosion of Railway Labor Act preemption.
146
Atchison, Topeka failed to persuade the Court that the resolu-
tion of "emotional injury" claims should be restricted to the
Railway Labor Act, lest all disgruntled employees turn to emo-
tional distress tort claims to avoid mandatory arbitration. 47 The
Court refused to alter existing statutory schemes and relied
upon the existing "outrageous conduct" standard for emotional
distress to curb any such tendencies.1 48 Accordingly, the Court
held that, although some aspects of Buell's complaint could be
addressed by Railway Labor Act procedures, the Act did not pre-
clude a subsequent action under FELA.1
49
2. State Law Exceptions to Labor Management Relations Act
Preemption
The Labor Management Relations Act grants federal jurisdic-
•tion over collective bargaining agreement disputes and contem-
plates a body of federal law for the interpretation and
enforcement of contracts between labor and management.
1 50
Section 185(a) "mandate [s] resort to federal rules of law in or-
der to ensure uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining
agreements, and thus to promote the peaceable, consistent reso-
lution of labor-management disputes." 51 Therefore, under the
Labor Management Relations Act, if the state-law claim requires
145 Id.
146 Buell 480 U.S. at 566. See discussion supra Part III.B. and discussion infra
Part IV.
147 Buell 480 U.S. at 566.
148 Id. at 566-67. f
14 Id. at 566; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23 (1987)
(rejecting National Labor Relations Act preemption of state statute governing
labor standards because statute did not impermissibly intrude upon the collective
bargaining process); Bielicke v. Terminal Ry., 30 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 1994) (dis-
pute challenging railroad's FELA claim investigation practices arises under Rail-
way Labor Act when railroad's investigatory powers determined by collective
bargaining agreement). But see Grote v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d 1307
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990) (rejecting employee's attempt to bring
independent FELA claim because FELA not extended to airline industry).
150 Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 403 (1988) (citing
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)).
15, Lingie, 486 U.S. at 404.
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interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, then the
claim is preempted and uniform federal labor laws govern. 152
In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,153 the Supreme
Court refused to preclude state law remedies for a labor dispute
arising under the Labor Management Relations Act when the
resolution of the state law claim did not require interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement.154 Jonna Lingle was dis-
charged from her Norge manufacturing plant job for filing an
allegedly false worker's compensation claim. Lingle initiated
the grievance procedure outlined in her union's collective bar-
gaining agreement with Norge and ultimately was awarded back
pay and reinstatement. 55 In the interim, Lingle filed suit in Illi-
nois state court for retaliatory discharge under state workers'
compensation laws.' 56 Norge removed the case to United States
district court and prevailed in its motion to dismiss.1 57 The dis-
trict court characterized the dispute as dependent upon inter-
pretation of the collective bargaining agreement for a
determination of what constituted "wrongful" discharge, and
was, therefore, subject to the mandatory arbitration required by
the collective bargaining agreement. 58 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 159 The Supreme Court, determining
that the elements of the state law claim required a "purely fac-
tual" inquiry into the conduct and motivations of employer and
employee that did not require interpretation of the collective
152 Id. at 406. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (refusing
to apply state bad-faith tort remedy for insurance claim handling when collective
bargaining agreement addressed employee's right to timely processing of claim);
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (awarding damages
to employer for union strike in violation of no-strike clause in collective bargain-
ing agreement).
153 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
154 Id. at 413.
155 The collective bargaining agreement required that any employee discharge
be for proper or just cause. Id. at 401.
156 Id. at 402. Under Illinois law, a claim for retaliatory discharge must show
that the employee was discharged (or that discharged was threatened) and that
the employer's actions were motivated by a desire to interfere with the em-
ployee's rights. Id. at 407.
157 Id.
158 Id.; see also discussion supra Part ll.B. Preemption extinguishes the state
right and requires resolution of the dispute under the arbitration provision of
the collective bargaining agreement. Adams, supra note 34, at 128. See generally
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
159 Lingle, 486 U.S. at 402-03.
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bargaining agreement, reversed and held that the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act did not preempt Lingle's claim.160
Preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act
turns, therefore, on the application of the "purely factual" test
to determine if the claim requires court interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement or if the state law remedy is in-
dependent of the terms of the agreement.1 6 1 Although the fac-
tual inquiry on the substantive elements of a state law retaliatory
discharge claim may be the same as the factual inquiry on the
substantive elements of a contractual wrongful discharge claim,
the Labor Management Relations Act only preempts those
causes of action that require contract interpretation, not causes
of action that rest on other, independent, substantive state
rights. 6 2 So long as "the state-law claim can be resolved without
interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is 'independent' of
the agreement for [185(a)] pre-emption purposes."1 63
In Lingle, the Supreme Court acknowledged the need to bal-
ance the uniform resolution of labor disputes under collective
bargaining agreements through arbitration against the protec-
tion of individual substantive rights. 64 In order to preserve the
effectiveness of arbitration, the parties involved must participate
in and be bound by the process.' 6- Problems arise, however,
when the goals of arbitration conflict with minimum protections
guaranteed to workers under state laws.' 66 The Lingle Court re-
solved this dilemma by determining that the uniform body of
substantive federal labor law was not endangered if the em-
ployee's claim was distinct and independent from a wrongful
termination question and did not require interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement, despite the shared factual in-
quiry.' 67 The Court therefore held that there is no preemption
under the Labor Management Relations Act when the state law
160 Id.
161 Id. at 402.
162 Id. at 408-09. See also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S. Ct. 2068 (1994).
163 Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410. Additionally, the Court left open the question
whether union members could waive substantive law rights in a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Id. at 410 n.9.
164 Id. at 410-11.
165 Id. at 411.
166 Id. at 411-12. See also supra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.
167 Lee Modjeska, Federalism in Labor Relations-The Last Decade, 50 OHIo ST.
L.J. 487, 506 (1989).
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claim only tangentially involves the collective bargaining
agreement. 168
IV. HAWAIIAN AIRLINES V NORRIS169
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two consolidated
Hawaii Supreme Court cases to examine the scope of Railway
Labor Act preemption in light of the Conrail and Lingle opin-
ions. 70 Hawaiian Airlines' main contention was that Norris'
wrongful discharge claim was a minor dispute and therefore
subject to the mandatory and comprehensive grievance proce-
dures outlined in the union's collective bargaining agreement
and governed by the Railway Labor Act. The Supreme Court
first focused on determining the parameters of a minor
dispute.171
Section 151 (a) of the Railway Labor Act sets forth its purpose
"to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes
168 Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202
(1985). In Lueck, the Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's finding that
the Labor Management Relations Act did not preempt a state law bad faith tort
claim, but stated in dicta:
Of course, not every dispute concerning employment or tangen-
tially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is
pre-empted by [§ 185(a)] or other provisions of the federal labor
law. [Section 185(a)] on its face says nothing about the substance
of what private parties may agree to in a labor contract. Nor is
there any suggestion that Congress, in adopting [§ 185 (a)], wished
to give the substantive provisions of private agreements the force of
federal law, ousting any inconsistent state regulation. Such a rule
of law would delegate to unions and unionized employers the
power to exempt themselves from whatever state labor standards
they disfavored.
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211-12.
169 114 S. Ct. 2239 (1994).
170 Id. at 2243, 2251 (state law claims of discharge in violation of public policy
and the Whistleblower Act are not preempted by the RLA); Rakestraw v. United
Airlines, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 474 (N.D. Il. 1991), rev'd in part, affd in part on other
grounds, 981 F.2d 1524 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 175 (1994) (tortious
interference claim preempted by RLA); O'Brien v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 972
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 980 (1993) (handicap discrimination
claim preempted by RLA); Pennsylvania Fed'n of the Bhd. of Maintenance of
Way Employees v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 989 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, .114 S. Ct. 85 (1993) (compensation scheme in violation of state minimum
wage law preempted by RLA); Spears v. Northwest Airlines, 798 F. Supp. 436
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (state law race discrimination claim not preempted by RLA);
Cooper v. Springfield Terminal Ry., 635 A.2d 952 (Me. 1993) (mandatory unpaid
training in violation of state statute not preempted by RLA).
171 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2244.
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growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or appli-
cation of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions."1 72 Relying upon this language, Hawaiian Airlines
argued that "grievances" must be distinct from disputes based
upon a collective bargaining agreement and should encompass
all non-contractual employment related disputes. According to
Hawaiian Airlines, any other interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage would create an unworkable redundancy. The Court re-
jected this interpretation for two reasons. First, Hawaiian
Airlines' expansive definition of "grievances" created overlap be-
cause everything following the "or" in the language quoted
above would be redundant. 17 Second, the Court relied on the
standard use of the word grievance in the labor law context to
mean claims "'which develop from the interpretation and/or
application of the contracts between the labor unions and the
carriers.'" 174 The Court was unwilling to expand the definition
because it could not find in the legislative history of the Railway
Labor Act any Congressional intent that would justify a defini-
tion permitting such broad preemptive reach.175
The Court reaffirmed, therefore, its previous definition of mi-
nor disputes as those growing out of a collective bargaining
agreement and dependent upon interpretation of the agree-
ment for resolution.176 Minor disputes are preempted by the
Railway Labor Act as the exclusive remedy.177 But, the Railway
Labor Act does not preempt claims arising from rights which are
independent of the collective bargaining agreement. 7  For ex-
ample, claims arising under state laws designed to regulate the
minimum number of workers for particular tasks were not pre-
empted. 79 Despite the need for uniformity and predictability in
labor law, the substantive protections guaranteed to workers by
172 45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1988). See discussion supra Part IIA.
173 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2244.
174 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934)).
175 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2245. In determining whether state law should be pre-
empted by federal law, "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone."
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) (quoting Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
176 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2245; see also Conrai4 491 U.S. 299, 303 (1989); Bue/4 480
U.S. 557, 563 (1987).
177 See discussion supra Part II.A.
178 Norris, 114 S. C. at 2246.
179 Id. (citing Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 258 (1931)).
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state law cannot be usurped by the procedural mechanisms of
the Railway Labor Act. 8 °
Thus, the dispositive issue in Norris was the source of the right
which Norris claimed Hawaiian Airlines violated.18 1 Although a
collective bargaining agreement may have addressed wrongful
discharge, Norris' claim was based solely on Hawaii law prohibit-
ing discharge in retaliation for whistleblowing.18 2 Although the
independent right asserted in Buell arose under federal law, the
Court has applied the same preemption analysis with respect to
state claims arising under state law.'1
3
The Court acknowledged that the emerging standard in Rail-
way Labor Act preemption cases parallels preemption standards
under the Labor Management Relations Act.18 4 "[A] state-law
cause of action is not pre-empted by the RLA if it involves rights
and obligations that exist independent of the collective-bargain-
ing agreement."is 5 Despite the -possibility of overlap, however,
an independent state law claim will survive preemption if analy-
sis of the claim does not require interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement.186 Under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, preemption turns on whether a claim is dependent or
independent of the labor contract, whereas under the Railway
Labor Act, preemption turns on the more problematic major/
minor dispute distinction.18
7
Emphasizing the similarity between the standards and goals of
the Railway Labor Act and the Labor Management Relations
Act, the Norris Court applied the reasoning of Lingle to the Rail-
way Labor Act preemption question.18 Generally, courts faced
with Railway Labor Act preemption issues have, without hesita-
tion, applied by analogy Labor Management Relations Act pre-
180 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2246; see also Modjeska, supra note 167, at 503 (consider-
ing "[n] onnegotiable state-law ights... independent of any right established by
contract" in a Labor Management Relations Act context).
181 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2246. Here, the "right not to be discharged wrongfully."
Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
184 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2247. See also supra notes 150-68 and accompanying text.
185 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2247.
186 Id. at 224849.
187 See Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2246-47. Compare Conrai 491 U.S. 299 (1989) with
Lingle, 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (Ling held that a state law tort remedy was not pre-
empted by the LMRA because interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment was unnecessary, while Conrail upheld preemption under the RLA because
it was a minor dispute.).
188 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2249 n.9.
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emption concepts.1 8 9 Some courts, however, maintain that the
preemption analysis differs under the two acts. 190 Specifically,
section 151 (a) of the Railway Labor Act provides a comprehen-
sive grant of preemptive authority. 191 The language of section
185(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, on the other
hand, permits but does not require preemption by providing
that disputes "between an employer and a labor organization...
may be brought in any district court of the United States... ,,192
Some courts have therefore concluded that the Acts are distin-
guishable and that preemptive powers under the Railway Labor
Act are broader than those under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act. 193
In Norris, the Supreme Court explicitly applied a Labor Man-
agement Relations Act preemption rationale to a dispute poten-
tially preempted by the Railway Labor Act.'94 The test, as
developed in Lingle, is whether resolution of the dispute relies
on "purely factual questions" about the conduct of the parties
and does not require interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement. 95 The Nonis Court reconciled the preemption ra-
tionale followed in Buell and Lingle with the result in Andrews, a
wrongful discharge claim preempted by the Railway Labor Act,
on the grounds that Andrews relied not on a distinct substantive
state law right but on a breach of contract theory requiring in-
terpretation of the labor contract.196
189 See, e.g., Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir.
1993); Davies v. American Airlines, Inc., 971 F.2d 463, 466-67 (10th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993); Rodriguez v. United Airlines, Inc., 812 F.
Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1992); McCann v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 758 F. Supp.
559, 562 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 593
A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. 1991).
190 E.g., Melanson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 931 F.2d 558, 562 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 865 (1991); Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094, 1097
(9th Cir. 1991); Grote v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990).
191 Grote, 905 F.2d at 1309; see discussion supra Part II.A.
192 29'U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988); Grote, 905 F.2d at 1309.
198 Grote, 905 F.2d at 1309-10. The Grote court explained: "Therefore, because
the RLA's preemptive force appears on the face of the statute and [LMRA] pre-
emption is judicially imposed, we conclude that preemption under the RLA is
broader than under [the LMRA]." Id. See also Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1962) ("incompatible doctrines of local law must
give way to principles of federal labor law").
194 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2249.
195 Id.; Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407.
196 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2249; Andrews, 406 U.S. at 323-24; see also Cox, supra note
28, at 1499 ("The line between interpreting a commercial contract and applying
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Next, the Court turned to the seemingly inapposite holdings
of Burley and Conrail197 The Court characterized Burley not as a
preemption question but as a question of the scope of the
union's authority to act on behalf of its members.1 98 Conse-
quently, all discussions in Burley concerning the scope of a mi-
nor dispute are dicta.1 99 Specifically, the Burley Court included
the so-called "omitted case" within the ambit of minor dis-
putes.200  An omitted case was one "founded upon some inci-
dent of the employment relation, or asserted one, independent
of those covered by the collective agreement, e.g., claims on ac-
count of personal injuries."20 ' The Norris Court dismissed the
Burley dicta, in part, because the main dispute in Burley con-
cerned the authority of the union; the parties agreed that the
dispute was minor and within the mandatory scheme of the Rail-
way Labor Act.20 2 The Norris Court also explained that "even the
'omitted case' dictum logically can refer to a norm that the par-
ties have created but have omitted from the collective-bargain-
ing agreement's explicit language, rather than to a norm
established by a legislature or a court."2 3 Finally, the Court re-
jected any language in Burley supporting the contention that a
minor dispute includes claims independent of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.20 4 Specifically, Burley's omitted case doc-
trine classified claims founded upon any incident of the
employment relationship as minor.20 5 This theory of preemp-
tion effectively collapses the major/minor distinction and po-
tentially would prohibit any court from having jurisdiction over
claims completely unrelated to the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.206
the principles of contract law is rarely significant... [t]hey blend almost imper-
ceptibly in borderline cases.").
197 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2249.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 2250.
200 Id.; see also supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
201 Burley, 325 U.S. at 723.
202 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2250.
203 Id. "[The contract] covers only a small part of their joint concern. It is
based upon a mass of unstated assumptions and practice as to which the under-
standing of the parties may actually differ, and which it is wholly impractical to
list in the agreement." Cox, supra note 28, at 1492 (brackets in original).
204 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2250.
205 Burley, 325 U.S. at 723.
206 Davies v. American Airlines, 971 F.2d 463, 467-68 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2439 (1993).
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After distinguishing Burley, the Norris Court also distinguished
Conrail on the grounds that it did not involve a relevant preemp-
tion analysis.2 °7 The Court characterized the dispute in Conrail
as whether or not the railroad's new drug testing policy was a
new contract term and therefore the subject of a major dispute
beyond the reach of the mandatory provisions of the Railway
Labor Act.20 8 Refusing to find that the modification of an ex-
isting practice constituted a new contract term, the Conrail
Court properly characterized the dispute as minor because the
question could only be "conclusively resolved" by interpreting
the existing terms of the collective bargaining agreement.20 9 Us-
ing this analysis, "to say that a minor dispute can be 'conclusively
resolved' by interpreting the [collective bargaining agreement]
is another way of saying that the dispute does not involve rights
that exist independent of the [collective bargaining agree-
ment] ."21 ° Therefore, such an analysis is consistent with the
holdings of Buell, Lingle and Norris. Even before the Norris deci-
sion, this language in Conrail has been interpreted to overrule
the Burley omitted case doctrine.
In Norris, Hawaiian Airlines unsuccessfully applied Conrails
"arguably justified" standard to characterize its dispute with Nor-
212ris as minor. Pointing to the collective bargaining agree-
ment's sanction of discharge for 'Just cause," Hawaiian Airlines
claimed that its dismissal of Norris was arguably justified under
the terms of the agreement and was, therefore, a minor dispute
governed by the Railway Labor Act.21 3 The Court rejected this
argument, finding that the arguably justified standard applied
only when making the major/minor dispute distinction and not
to an interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.21 4 Thus, the threshold question is whether a dispute
is, subject to the Railway Labor Act.2 15 In other word a court
must first determine whether the claim is subject to Railway La-
bor Act preemption before embarking on a major/minor
analysis.




211 Davies, 971 F.2d at 467.
212 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2250-51. See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.




The threshold question is decided against preemption if the
employee's claim turns on a "purely factual question" concern-
ing conduct that does not require a separate interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement, even if the question could
also be resolved under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.21 6 In Nornis, Norris' claim could potentially be re-
solved in one of two ways: (1) by interpreting the meaning of
just cause under the collective bargaining agreement, or (2) by
examining Hawaiian Airlines' motive in discharging Norris.217
The first form of the claim is preempted by the Railway Labor
Act because it requires interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.218 But the second form of the claim is not pre-
empted because it is a purely factual question and is distinct
from the collective bargaining agreement.21 9 The greatest dan-
ger in this line of analysis is the emergence of the "artfully-
crafted" pleading constructed to avoid preemption.22 °
V. CONCLUSION
Confusion surrounds the question of Railway Labor Act pre-
emption, as reflected in the conflicting decisions among the cir-
cuits and within the Supreme Court's own opinions. 2 1 The
cause of the confusion can be attributed to two types of
problems with the courts' analyses. The first problem occurs
when a court bases its preemption decision on a classification
that is itself being challenged by the disputing parties. The
second problem occurs when courts collapse the major/minor
dispute and dependent/independent claim tests into one stan-
dard, causing results that vary according to the order in which
each prong of the test is addressed.2 23
216 Id. at 2251.
217 Id.
218 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2251.
219 Id.
220 See Maher v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 593 A.2d 750, 757 (N.J.
1991). Cf Calvert v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 959 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting former pilot's claim that airline practice of medical testing permitted
by collective bargaining agreement was actionable harassment under state tort
law); Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1991) (preempt-
ing RICO claim as an attempt to disguise disability benefits dispute).
221 See discussion supra Part III.
222 See discussion supra Part III.A.
223 See Calvert, 959 F.2d at 699 (relying on classification of dispute); Grote v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 905 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958
(1990) (using arguably justified standard to support preemption).
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In Norris, the Supreme Court clarified the tests and standards
set forth in prior opinions. By focusing its analysis on the source
of the allegedly violated right, instead of on the classification of
the dispute, the Court separated the preemption question from
procedural considerations under the Railway Labor Act.224
When faced with a potentially preempted state law claim, post-
Norris courts now have a two-part test. The first question is
whether the claim may be preempted by the Railway Labor
Act.225 Preemption is improper when the claim is independent
of the collective bargaining agreement.226  A dispute is in-
dependent if it may be resolved through purely factual ques-
tions.2 v Only when a claim is dependent upon interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore preempted
under the Railway Labor Act, does classification of the dispute
come into play. 8 After a court determines that a claim will be
preempted by the Railway Labor Act, it must determine if the
dispute is major or minor.229 A dispute is minor, and therefore
subject to mandatory and binding administrative procedures, if
the challenged conduct is arguably justified by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.2 30 If the conduct is not argua-
bly justified, the claim is major and may be pursued further if
the dispute resolution mechanisms set forth in the Railway La-
bor Act fail.2 1
A comparison of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pre- and
post-Norris decisions in Hirras v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.232 illustrates the impact of the Supreme Court's decision
on Railway Labor Act preemption cases. Hirras brought a gen-
der discrimination suit in federal court against her employer,
the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak). Hirras
asserted claims under Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act,2 33 as well
as state law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of
224 See supra notes 183-200.
225 See Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2248.
226 Id. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
227 Norris, 114 S. Ct. at 2248. For pre-Norris Railway Labor Act preemption anal-
ysis synthesizing the concepts subsequently set out by the Supreme Court, see
Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1993).
228 See discussion supra Part II.A.
229 Id.
230 See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
231 See discussion supra Part II.A.
232 10 F.3d 1142 (5th Cir.), cert. granted andjdg't vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2732 (1994)
[hereinafter Hirras 1].
233 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
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emotional distress. Hirras claimed constructive discharge based
upon a hostile work environment consisting of verbal abuse by
her co-workers, abusive telephone calls and notes from un-
known sources, and offensive graffiti. The district court held
that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was
preempted by the Railway Labor Act, and the Title VII claim was
subject to the Act's mandatory arbitration provisions.23 4 In its
decision released before the Supreme Court's Norris opinion,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court.235 On appeal, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the appellate court's
decision, and remanded for consideration in light of the Norris
opinion.23 6
In originally affirming the district court's finding that the
Railway Labor Act preempted Hirras' claims, the Fifth Circuit
first characterized the dispute as minor,237 and then focused on
federal labor policies favoring arbitration. 38 The court re-
jected Hirras' claim that her Title VII claim was not subject to
the arbitration procedures of the Railway Labor Act and deter-
mined that "there exist no federal or congressional policies
prohibiting the submission of discrimination claims to arbitra-
tion."239 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 encourages alternative
methods of dispute resolution for Title VII claims.240 Under the
Railway Labor Act, arbitration is the only recourse for minor dis-
putes arising out of the employment relationship.24 1 Thus, fed-
eral policies favoring arbitration are applicable because the
statutory duty to arbitrate labor disputes is extensive and be-
cause Tide VII does not prohibit arbitration.242
The pre-Norris Fifth Circuit decision distinguished Buel 4 3 on
the ground that Railway Labor Act preemption of disputes aris-
ing out of conduct actionable under FELA would defeat the pur-
234 Hirras I, 10 F.3d at 1144. The district court also held that Texas does not
recognize claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and granted Am-
trak's motion to dismiss on that claim. Id.
235 Id.
236 Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2732 (1994).
237 Hirras I, 10 F.3d at 1145, 1147.
238 Id. at 1145-46.
239 Id. at 1146. The court relied on Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991), for the proposition that compulsory arbitration is both adequate
and consistent with statutory anti-discrimination schemes. See Hirras I, 10 F.3d at
1146.
240 Hirras I, 10 F.3d at 1146.
241 Id. at 1146-47.
242 Id. at 1145-47.
243 See supra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.
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pose behind FELA, which is to provide a federal remedy for
injuries received by railroad employees due to the negligence of
the railroad or co-workers. 24 Title VII, on the other hand, en-
courages alternative dispute resolution.2 45 Finally, the court
held that Hirras' state law claim for intentional infliction of'
emotional distress was a minor dispute because it "grew out of
the employment relationship and therefore is inextricably inter-
twined with the terms and conditions of her employment."2 46 As
such, it required interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement to determine what Amtrak was required to do in re-
sponse to Hirras' complaint of harassment and to determine an
appropriate remedy.247
On remand following the Supreme Court's decision in Norris,
the Fifth Circuit's preemption analysis changed drastically.
2 48
Significantly, no mention is made of federal policies favoring ar-
bitration of labor disputes. 49 Instead, the court analyzed
whether the resolution of Hirras' claims required interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement. 5 ° In so doing, the court
focused its inquiry on the source of the violated right.251 The
court then rejected Amtrak's argument that a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress arises out of the collective
bargaining agreement because the agreement determines the
standard by which Amtrak's conduct is judged. 52 Relying on
Texas' "outrageous" conduct standard for claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the court held that the collective
bargaining agreement did not contain provisions that related to,
or allowed Amtrack to permit, sexual harassment.253 Thus, the
Railway Labor Act did not preempt Hirras' gender discrimina-
tion and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims be-
244 Hirras I, 10 F.3d at 1148.
245 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note (Supp. 1993)).
246 Id. at 1149.
247 Id.
248 Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 44 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1995) [here-
inafter Hirras II].
249 See supra notes 23-30, 40-44 and accompanying text. In a footnote, however,
the court hinted that federal policies favoring arbitration must give way to state-
based substantive rights. Hirras II, 44 F.3d at 284 n.15 (citing'Bue/, 480 U.S. at
565).
250 Hirras II, 44 F.3d at 282-83.
251 Id. at 282.
252 Id. at 282-83.
253 Id. at 284.
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cause Hirras asserted rights independent of the collective
bargaining agreement.2 54
Although the debate will continue over whether the Railway
Labor Act preempts an aggrieved employee's claim, one thing is
clear: Norris signals the rejection of long-standing policies favor-
ing uniform federal labor law and arbitration. The individual
states' substantive interest in enforcing employee rights and in
,regulating the workplace will now receive equal consideration in
federal courts. A survey of post-Norris decisions indicates that
courts will strictly construe the Railway Labor Act preemption
and will intervene in employment disputes with increasing fre-
quency.2 5 5 The focus will now be on the claimant's complaint.
For example, in determining whether the collective bargaining
agreement is the only source of the claimant's right, courts will
have to distinguish between a claim asserting the violation of a
substantive state protection and a claim challenging the bounda-
ries of just cause as defined by the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 2 56 Given "the multitude of state laws addressing discharge
issues [,]J 257 Railway Labor Act preemption will now turn on the
claimant's ability to craft a pleading invoking independent
rights and the defendant carrier's ability to limit the claimant's
right to recovery to the express terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Arguably, Norris and its progeny will undermine
254 Id.
255 Taggert v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269 (8th Cir. 1994) (RLA
does not preempt handicap discrimination claim); Westbrook v. Sky Chefs, Inc.,
35 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 1994) (RLA does not preempt claim for retaliatory dis-
charge in violation of state statute); Hogan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 880 F.
Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1995) (RLA does not preempt a disability discrimination
claim based on the employer's failure to hire employee for another position
while on layoff); Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1452 (D. Kan. 1995)
(RLA does not preempt wrongful termination, defamation, and tortious interfer-
ence claims); Cooper v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 870 F. Supp. 1410 (S.D. W. Va.
1994) (RIA does not preempt claim under state anti-discrimination statute);
Pratt, Bradford & Tobin, P.C. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 876 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Ill.
1994) (RIA does not preempt tortious interference claim challenging railroad's
FELA investigation practices); Mumford v. CSX Transp., 878 F. Supp. 827
(M.D.N.C. 1994), (RLA does not preempt race discrimination and retaliatory dis-
charge claims under Title VII, section 1981, and state wrongful discharge stat-
ute); United Transp. Union v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 862 F. Supp. 55
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (RIA does not preempt claim challenging railroad rule prohibit-
ing employees from providing information during FELA investigations).
256 See Underwood v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 78, 85 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
257 Supreme Court Allows Fired Worker to Sue Airlines in State Court, AVIATION DAILY,
June 21, 1994, at 463 (Air Transport Association statement).
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the continued development of uniform federal labor law. But
state-law remedies never before available to unionized employ-
ees will offer additional workplace protections and safeguard
employee rights. After Norris, the viability of federal labor poli-
cies and the effectiveness of state regulation will be tested as
courts strike a new balance between the competing state and
federal interests.
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